Proto-Privateer Opportunities
The Problem: The Office of Foreign Assets Control currently designates over 1,400 vessels, including more than 400 large tanker-class ships, linked to U.S. adversaries and transnational sanctions-evasion networks. These vessels continue to move oil and other commodities on the high seas, generating sustained revenue for regimes and entities engaged in terrorism sponsorship, coercive state behavior, and economic warfare.
Despite this extensive designation regime, actual interdiction and forfeiture rates remain incredibly low. In 2025 and early 2026, fewer than ten sanctioned vessels were seized or taken into custody, leaving the overwhelming majority of designated ships operational. This gap between designation and enforcement allows sanctioned networks to function largely uninterrupted, undermining the credibility, deterrent value, and strategic impact of U.S. sanctions policy.
Value Statement: Proto-Privateering for Sanctions Enforcement
Proto-privateering offers a scalable enforcement mechanism to convert sanctions designations into real economic and strategic effects. By authorizing and incentivizing dispersed private actors to identify, seize, transfer, or facilitate the forfeiture of sanctioned vessels under government oversight, the United States could rapidly expand enforcement capacity without proportional increases in government force structure or operating costs.
Conservatively, the seizure and liquidation of even a fraction of OFAC-listed tanker vessels represents over $13 billion in asset value, while depriving adversarial regimes of far greater long-term revenue streams tied to ongoing commodity exports. A sustained proto-privateering model would simultaneously:
- Impose material costs on sanctioned actors,
- Restore deterrence to U.S. sanctions regimes,
- Generate lawful compensation and business opportunities for U.S. operators, insurers, service providers, and customers
In short, proto-privateering transforms sanctions from an essentially static compliance tool into an active, self-funding enforcement capability aligned with U.S. strategic and economic interests.
Potential Legal Enablers:
- The Proposed Cartel Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act of 2025 is currently going through the legislative process. While the bill, as written, would likely apply only to cartels, which could include about 26 oil tankers and 50 other vessels, totaling a conservative 702 million, it would still be a significant step.
- Innovative performance incentive contracts that use private actors to provide transportation and security for enforcement agents could be implemented without legislative approval.
- Pilot Program to enable the Department of the Treasury agency direct access to revenue from operations to pay contractors.
- Contract with an international partner to be paid from the proceeds of seized and forfeited sanctioned assets in conjunction with other allied sanctions programs.
- Salvage law to enable the sale of “abandoned” sanctioned assets that may pose a threat to the environment, with a memorandum of understanding that none of the proceeds from salvage operations benefit a sanctioned entity, and providing indemnity to the salvage firm
Risk and Mitigations:
| Disputed legal authority to seize/forfeit cargo (flag state, port state, owner challenges). | Operate only under written authority/MOU from sponsor; obtain pre-operation legal opinions (maritime + local counsel); include arbitration/forum clauses and escrow for disputed proceeds |
| Violating sanctions or mistakenly dealing with sanctioned persons/entities. | Mandatory automated + manual sanctions & BOI screening; retained sanctions counsel for high-value cases; contractual warranties and indemnities from counterparties. |
| Diplomatic incidents or escalation in sensitive/contested waters (Indian Ocean chokepoints). | Strict geofencing, sponsor diplomatic coordination, letters of consent/de-confliction, real-time legal review before operations, and robust public affairs and messaging in support of operations. |
| Inconsistency or delay of revenue stream from prize adjudication and liquidation. | Clear contractual formulas, escrowed proceeds, pre-arranged auction/disposal partners, and operating reserves for legal delays. |
| Armed resistance, violent retaliation, or criminal interference during operations. | Embarked accredited law-enforcement or military advisors for high-risk boardings, defined ROE compliant with sponsor law, threat assessments, and naval escort coordination. |
Problem Statement: IUU Fishing and Maritime Human Trafficking Enforcement Gap
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing imposes billions of dollars in economic losses annually, degrades marine ecosystems, undermines legitimate U.S. fishermen, and fuels transnational criminal networks. Increasingly, IUU fishing is also linked to severe human rights abuses, including human trafficking, forced labor, and debt bondage aboard fishing vessels, where crews are isolated at sea for months or years beyond effective oversight.
Within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), foreign and domestic vessels exploit the vastness of maritime space, limited patrol capacity, and evidentiary challenges to operate with a high probability of impunity. According to the United States Coast Guard Inspector General, during the most recent reporting period, the Coast Guard detected hundreds of suspected illegal fishing incursions in U.S. waters but interdicted only approximately 20% of identified targets. The remaining ~80% of suspected IUU activity was not interdicted, primarily due to asset scarcity, competing mission priorities, and the high cost of sustained patrol operations.
This enforcement gap allows illegal fishing fleets to continue extracting value from U.S. waters while simultaneously externalizing environmental, economic, security, and humanitarian costs onto the public. Vessels engaged in IUU fishing frequently rely on coerced or trafficked labor, meaning failures in fisheries enforcement also enable ongoing human exploitation, abuse, and loss of life at sea.
Value Statement: Proto-privateering offers a scalable, cost-effective mechanism to close the IUU and maritime forced-labor enforcement gap by aligning private incentives with public outcomes. By authorizing and empowering private firms to provide detection, interdiction support, evidence collection, and vessel monitoring under government oversight and embedded law-enforcement authority, the United States can dramatically expand adequate coverage of its EEZ without proportional increases in government fleet size or operating budgets.
Performance-based compensation tied to verified interdictions, seized catch, forfeited vessels, levied fines, and documented labor-abuse outcomes converts IUU enforcement from a purely cost-centered mission into an outcome-driven, partially self-funding capability that can:
- Deter repeat offenders through credible enforcement risk
- Protect U.S. fisheries and coastal economies
- Disrupt human trafficking, forced labor, and associated criminal networks
- Enable the identification, rescue, and referral of trafficked or abused crew members
- Free government cutters and aircraft for higher-end national security missions
- Export proto-privateering capabilities to partner nations struggling to secure their own EEZs
In effect, proto-privateering transforms IUU fishing enforcement from a capacity-constrained patrol problem into a distributed enforcement ecosystem, leveraging private persistence, capital, and innovation to increase interdiction rates, impose meaningful consequences on offenders, and protect both marine resources and human life at sea.
Legal Enablers:
- Performance Incentive Contracting Model subsidized by fines and seizures.
- Pilot Program to enable awarding agency access to revenue from operations to pay contractors.
- Embedded Law Enforcement Officers to using their authorities to conduct seizures.
Estimated Prize Value: $1,000s in share of fines or millions of dollars for seizing large commercial fishing trawlers. Varies based on whether the catch is seized or if the trawler is seized, forfeited, and auctioned.
Prize Liquidation method: Performance Incentive Contracting via federal or state governments/ profit sharing based on seizures or levied fines and forfeitures.
Risk and Mitigations:
| Evidence challenged in court (chain of custody, sensor integrity). | Tamper-evident logging, redundant sensors, third-party forensic validation. |
| Perception of private actors performing law enforcement. | Strict contractual language and public messaging clarifying non-kinetic role; MOU with coastguard. |
| Escalation or diplomatic incident if operations cross boundaries. | Clear geofencing, international coordination, legal review, and adherence to State consent. |
| Inconsistency of revenue for the firm. | Baseline payment for the firm or using unmanned sensors to provide data to other government or private customers, acquire grants from environmental agencies and NGOs |
Problem Statement: Illicit narcotics trafficking along maritime routes continues to inflict severe societal, economic, and security harms in the United States. Despite substantial interdiction efforts, transnational criminal organizations leverage vast oceanic corridors and high-speed vessels to transport drugs with high profit margins and low deterrent risk.
Even with these unprecedented enforcement results, the sheer volume trafficked through maritime routes, with 80 % of U.S.-bound narcotics seized at sea, underlines the continued viability of maritime routes.
Value Statement: Proto-privateering would expand enforcement reach and deterrence by harnessing private sector operational capacity under performance-based contracting to identify, pursue, and support interdictions of transnational narcotics smuggling. Given the scale of maritime drug flows — hundreds of thousands of pounds annually — incremental capacity adds disproportionately to total interdictions.
By aligning compensation with verified seizures and interdiction outcomes, a distributed private enforcement ecosystem can:
- Increase pressure on high-volume maritime trafficking corridors,
- Enable persistent tracking and interdiction beyond what current Coast Guard assets can sustain,
- Deliver cost-effective results by shifting outcome risk to pay-for-performance models, and
- Reduce the volume of illicit drugs entering the U.S., thus degrading the economic base of criminal and terrorist networks.
Estimated Prize Value: Based on50% of the cost of manufacturing the narcotic in the source country.
Prize Liquidation method: Based off the pre-agreed value of seized contraband to include narcotics.
Risk and Mitigations:
| Evidence challenged in court (chain of custody, sensor integrity). | Tamper-evident logging, redundant sensors, third-party forensic validation. |
| Perception of private actors performing law enforcement. | Embarked law enforcement provides legal justification and guidance. |
| Escalation or diplomatic incident if operations cross boundaries. | Clear geofencing, international coordination, legal review, and adherence to State consent. |
| Inconsistency of revenue for privateering firm. | Baseline payment for firm or using unmanned sensors to provide data to other government or private customers, acquire grants from environmental agencies and NGOs |
Privateer Opportunities
Problem Statement: Adversaries of the United States, including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others, rely on major sea lines of communication to transport vital supplies, including energy exports and rare-earth minerals. In the event of a likely conflict with any of these actors, and specifically China, cutting off sea lines of communication and an adversary's capability to import supplies would be a crucial component of winning a conflict. Using United States Navy or Coast Guard assets would become difficult in a dispute with China, with its growing Navy, vast merchant fleet, and maritime militia.
Value Statement: Privateering offers a force multiplier option to the United States that could be self-sustaining and even profitable for the United States if it were to successfully utilize prize law or other similar systems to allow for the proceeds from auctioned vessels to be sold off, providing an economic benefit to the United States and its allies.
Legal Enablers:
- Letter of Marque capability delegated to a joint federal center supporting Title 50 authorities or 10 authorities.
- Performance incentive contract with services tied to successful criminal, administrative, and civil seizures.
- Letter of Marque capability delegated to a joint federal center
Estimated Prize Value: A wartime economy would likely result in the value of merchant cargo, and the value of scrapped ships would conservatively stand well over 500 billion
Prize Liquidation method: Based on the auctioned value of the ships according to U.S prize law, or based on a pre-agreed value provided by a federal center based on benchmarking the value of the vessel.
Risk and Mitigations:
| Evidence challenged in court (chain-of-custody, sensor integrity). | Tamper-evident logging, redundant sensors, third-party forensic validation. |
| Perception of private actors performing law enforcement. | Public messaging |
| Escalation or diplomatic incident if operations cross boundaries. | Clear geofencing, international coordination, legal coordination |
| Privateers are not recognized as having rights under the Laws of Armed Conflict. | Public messaging that privateers are lawful combatants and deserving of all rights and consideration under the Geneva Convention. |
Problem Statement: Space, which has become integral to many societal functions, including the military, is now utilized and contested by our adversaries. These space assets play equally integral roles for the adversary, enabling its military with communications, navigation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, all of which threaten United States military assets.
Value Statement: Private space industry developing dual-use technologies, such as orbit maintenance and debris removal, could also provide a capability to threaten or remove adversary space assets while preserving exquisite U.S. space capabilities.
Legal Enablers:
- Letter of Marque capability delegated to a joint federal center supporting title 10 or title 50 authorities.
- Performance incentive contract tied to successful contract requirements
- Letter of Marque capability delegated to a military component
Estimated Prize Value: 2 to 5 million for a successful contract
Prize Liquidation method: A private firm is paid under a contract with the United States for selling freed-up orbital slots to generate revenue from orbital operations.
Risk and Mitigations:
| Generation of space debris endangering other satellites (chain of custody, sensor integrity). | Collateral damage estimates and mediation recommendations to be approved by a government representative |
| Perception of private actors performing law enforcement. | Public messaging |
| Attribution and risk of misidentification. | Coordinating with Allied Space Domain Awareness agencies to positively identify adversary space assets |
| Risk of Escalation | Only utilize orbital privateers in armed conflict and ensure legal can review each target to ensure a defense nexus. |
| Privateers are not recognized as having rights under the Laws of Armed Conflict. | Public messaging that privateers are lawful combatants and deserving of all rights and consideration under the Geneva Convention. |
Problem Statement: The United States and the global economy are increasingly integrated with and dependent on cyberspace. Adversaries, ranging from small criminal organizations to state-backed actors, have extorted billions of dollars and continue to threaten critical infrastructure. Cybercrime, exploitation, and attacks are likely to proliferate, forcing the U.S. government to prioritize limited resources. Even when assets are recovered, these operations often generate significant revenue and strategic advantage for adversaries.
Value Statement: Cybersecurity firms, digital forensics teams, and threat intelligence providers can be leveraged to identify, infiltrate, and disrupt ransomware networks at scale. By targeting payment infrastructure, command-and-control nodes, and affiliated cryptocurrency wallets, authorized cyber privateers can enable the seizure and forfeiture of illicit proceeds. In conflict or crisis environments, these actors serve as a force multiplier—expanding the reach of state authorities to degrade ransomware ecosystems faster than adversaries can regenerate them.
Legal Enablers:
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Letter of Marque capability delegated to a joint federal center supporting title 10 or title 50 authorities.
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Performance incentive contract tied to successful contract requirements tied to disrupted or seized adversary assets.
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Letter of Marque capability delegated to a military component
Prize Liquidation method: Prize value determined based on the successful operation, based on the disruption of illicit revenue streams, seizure of digital assets (e.g., cryptocurrency), or neutralization of high-value cyber infrastructure.
Risk and Mitigations:
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Risk |
Mitigation |
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Attribution difficulty or misattribution |
Collateral damage estimates and mediation recommendations to be approved by a government representative. |
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Perception of private actors performing law enforcement. |
Public messaging and the incorporation of law enforcement officers into cyber privateering units. |
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Attribution and risk of misidentification. |
Thorough application of analytic tradecraft to determine adversary actors. Diplomatic messaging that malicious actors operating from or with a state’s consent could be liable for damages. |
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Risk of Escalation and collateral damage |
Collateral damage estimates and mediation recommendations to be approved by a government representative. |